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Abstract
In papers published in the 25 years following his famous 1964 proof
John Bell refined and reformulated his views on locality and causality.
Although his formulations of local causality were in terms of probability,
he had little to say about that notion. But assumptions about probability
are implicit in his arguments and conclusions. Probability does not con-
form to these assumptions when quantum mechanics is applied to account
for the particular correlations Bell argues are locally inexplicable. This
account involves no superluminal action and there is even a sense in which
it is local, but it is in tension with the requirement that the direct causes
and effects of events are nearby.
1 Introduction
I never met John Bell, but his writings have supplied me with a continual source
of new insights as I read and reread them over 40 years. In working toward a
rather different understanding of quantum mechanics he has been foremost in
my mind as a severe but honest critic of such attempts. We all would love to
know what Einstein would have made of Bell’s theorem. I confess the deep
regret I feel that Bell cannot respond to this paper is sometimes assuaged by a
sense of relief.
2 Locality and Local Causality
In his seminal 1964 paper, John Bell expressed locality as the requirement
that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by
operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the
past. [2004, p. 14]
This seems to require that the result of a measurement would have been the
same, no matter what operations had been performed on such a distant system.
But suppose the result of a measurement were the outcome of an indeterministic
process. Then the result of the measurement might have been different even
1
if exactly the same operations (if any) had been performed on that distant
system. So can no indeterministic theory satisfy the locality requirement? Bell
felt no need to address that awkward question in his 1964 paper, since he took
the EPR argument to establish that any additional variables needed to restore
locality and causality would have to determine a unique result of a measurement.
Indeterminism was not an option:
Since we can predict in advance the result of measuring any chosen
component of σ2 [in the Bohm-EPR scenario], by previously mea-
suring the same component of σ1, it follows that the result of any
such measurement must actually be predetermined. (op. cit., p. 15)
Afterwards he repeatedly stressed that any theory proposed as an attempt
to complete quantum theory while restoring locality and causality need not be
assumed to be deterministic: to recover such perfect (anti)correlations it would
have to be deterministic. This argument warrants closer examination, and I’ll
come back to it. But in later work Bell offered formulations of locality conditions
tailored to theories that were not deterministic.
An initial motivation may have been to facilitate experimental tests of
attempted local, causal completions of quantum mechanics by suitable measure-
ments of spin or polarization components on pairs of separated systems repre-
sented by entangled quantum states. Inevitable apparatus imperfections would
make it impossible to confirm a quantum prediction of perfect (anti)correlation
for matched components, so experiment alone could not require a local, causal
theory to reproduce them. Einstein himself thought some theory might come
to underlie quantum mechanics much as statistical mechanics underlies thermo-
dynamics. In each case there would be circumstances in which the more basic
theory (correctly) predicts deviations from behavior the less basic theory leads
one to expect.
But by 1975 a second motivation had become apparent—the hope that
by revising or reformulating quantum mechanics as a theory of local beables
one might remove ambiguity and arrive at increased precision. It is in this
context that Bell now introduces a requirement of local causality. This differs
in two ways from his earlier locality requirement. It is not a requirement on
the world, but on theories of local beables: and it applies to theories that are
probabilistic, with deterministic theories treated as a special case in which all
probabilities are 0 or 1 (and densities are delta functions).1 Bell ([1975], [1985])
designs his requirement of local causality as a generalization of a requirement
of local determinism met by Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory. In source-free
Maxwellian electromagnetism, the local beables are the values of the electric and
magnetic fields at each point (x, t). This theory is locally deterministic because
1While Bell did not make this explicit in 1975, his 1990 paper also notes the analogy with
source-free Maxwellian electromagnetism, and there he does say:
The deterministic case is a limit of the probabilistic case, the probabilities be-
coming delta functions. [2004, p. 240]
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the field values in a space-time region are uniquely determined by their values
at an earlier moment in a finite volume of space that fully closes the backward
light cone of that region.
Local causality arises by generalizing to theories in which the assignment
of values to some beables Λ implies, not necessarily a particular value, but a
probability distribution Pr(A|Λ), for another beable A. Here is how Bell ([2004,
p. 54]) defines it (in my notation):
Let N denote a specification of all the beables, of some theory,
belonging to the overlap of the backward light cones of space-like
separated regions 1 and 2. Let Λ be a specification of some be-
ables from the remainder of the backward light cone of 1, and B
of some beables in the region 2. Then in a locally causal theory
Pr(A|Λ, N,B) = Pr(A|Λ, N) whenever both probabilities are given
by the theory.
If M is a specification of some beables from the backward light cone of 2 but
not of 1, then (assuming the joint probability distribution Pr(A,B|Λ,M,N)
exists)
Pr(A,B|Λ,M,N) = Pr(A|Λ,M,N,B).P r(B|Λ,M,N) (1)
= Pr(A|Λ, N).P r(B|Λ,M) (2)
where (1) follows from the definition of conditional probability, and (2) follows
for any locally causal theory. This means that any theory of local beables that
is locally causal satisfies the condition
Pr(A,B|Λ,M,N) = Pr(A|Λ, N).P r(B|Λ,M) (3)
In his 1990 presentation Bell modified his formulation of local causality,
in part in response to constructive criticisms. He also defended his revised
formulation by appeal to an Intuitive Principle of local causality (IP), namely
The direct causes (and effects) of events are near by, and even the
indirect causes (and effects) are no further away than permitted by
the velocity of light. [2004, p. 239]
Here is Bell’s revised formulation of Local Causality (LC):
A theory will be said to be locally causal if the probabilities attached
to values of local beables in a space-time region 1 are unaltered
by specification of values of local beables in a space-like separated
region 2, when what happens in the backward light cone of 1 is
already sufficiently specified, for example by a full specification of
local beables in a space-time region 3 [a thick ”slice” that fully closes
the backward light cone of region 1 wholly outside the backward light
cone of 2]. (op. cit., p. 240).
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Bell [1990] then applies this condition to a schematic experimental scenario
involving a linear polarization measurement on each photon in an entangled
pair in which the polarizer setting a and outcome recording A for one photon
occur in region 1, while those (b, B ) for the other photon occur in region 2.
He derives a condition analogous to (3) and uses it to prove a CHSH inequality
whose violation is predicted by quantum mechanics for the chosen entangled
state for certain sets of choices of a, b.2
Pr(A,B|a, b, c, λ) = Pr(A|a, c, λ).P r(B|b, c, λ) (Factorizability)
Not only did this proof not assume the theory of local beables was determinis-
tic, even this (Factorizability) condition was not assumed but derived from the
reformulated local causality requirement.
Bell’s formulation of local causality (LC) has been carefully analyzed by
Norsen [2011], whose analysis has been further improved by Seevinck and Uffink
[2011]. They have focused in their analyses on what exactly is involved in a
sufficient specification of what happens in the backward light cone of 1. This
specification could fail to be sufficient through failing to mention local beables
in 3 correlated with local beables in 2 through a joint correlation with local
beables in the overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2. A violation of
a local causality condition that did not require such a sufficient specification
would pose no threat to the intuitive principle of local causality: specification
of beables in 2 could alter the probabilities of beables in 1 if unspecified beables
in 3 were correlated with both through a (factorizable) common cause in the
overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2. On the other hand, requiring a
specification of all local beables in 3, may render the condition (LC) inapplicable
in attempting to show how theories meeting it predict correlations different from
those successfully predicted by quantum theory.
To see the problem, consider the set-up for the intended application depicted
in Figure 1. A,B describe macroscopic events3, each usually referred to as the
detection of a photon linearly polarized either vertically or horizontally relative
to an a- or b-axis respectively: a,b label events at which an axis is selected
by rotating through an angle a◦, b◦ respectively from some fixed direction in a
plane. The region previously labeled 3 has been relabeled as 3a, a matching
region 3b has been added in the backward light cone of 2, and ‘3’ now labels the
entire continuous “stack” of space-like hypersurfaces right across the backward
light cones of 1 and 2, shielding off these light cones’ overlap from 1,2 themselves.
Note that each of 1,a is space-like separated from each of 2, b.
2Both λ and c are assumed confined to region 3 (now symmetrically extended so as also to
close the backward light cone of 2): c stands for the values of magnitudes characterizing the
experimental set-up in terms admitted by ordinary quantum mechanics, while λ specifies the
values of magnitudes introduced by the theory supposed to complete quantum mechanics. It
will not be necessary to mention c in what follows.
3I use each of ‘A’,‘B’ to denote a random variable with values {VA,HA}, {VB , HB} respec-
tively. eA (e¯A) denotes the event in region 1 of Alice’s photon being registered as vertically
(horizontally) polarized. eB (e¯B) denotes the event in region 2 of Bob’s photon being regis-
tered as vertically (horizontally) polarized.
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Figure 1:
In some theories, a complete specification of local beables in 3 would con-
strain (or even determine) the selection events a,b. But in the intended appli-
cation a,b must be treated as free variables in the following sense: in applying a
theory to a scenario of the relevant kind each of a,b is to be specifiable indepen-
dently in a theoretical model, and both are taken to be specifiable independently
of a specification of local beables in region 3. Since this may exclude some com-
plete theoretical specifications of beables in region 3 it is best not to require
such completeness. Instead, one should say exactly what it is for a specification
to be sufficient.
Seevinck and Uffink [2011] clarify this notion of sufficiency as a combination
of functional and statistical sufficiency, rendering the label b and random vari-
able B (respectively) redundant for predicting Pra,b(A|B, λ), the probability
a theory specifies for beable A representing the outcome recorded in region 1
given beables a,b representing the free choices of what the apparatus settings
are in sub-regions of 1,2 respectively, conditional on outcome B in region 2 and
beable specification λ in region 3. This implies
Pra,b(A|B, λ) = Pra(A|λ) (4a)
Notice that a, b are no longer treated as random variables, as befits their status
as the locus of free choice. It would be unreasonable to require a theory of
local beables to predict the probability that the experimenters make one free
choice rather than another: but treating a, b as random variables (as in Bell’s
formulation of Factorizability) would imply the existence of probabilities of the
form Pr(a|λ), Pr(b|λ).
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By symmetry, interchanging ‘1’ with ‘2’, ‘A’ with ‘B’ and ‘a’ with ‘b’ implies
Pra,b(B|A, λ) = Prb(B|λ) (4b)
Seevinck and Uffink [2011] offer equations (4a) and (4b) as their mathe-
matically sharp and clean (re)formulation of the condition of local causality.
Together, these equations imply the condition
Pra,b(A,B|λ) = Pra(A|λ)× Prb(B|λ) (FactorizabilitySU )
used to derive CHSH inequalities. Experimental evidence that these inequalities
are violated by the observed correlations in just the way quantum theory leads
one to expect may then be taken to disconfirm Bell’s intuitive causality principle.
In more detail, Seevinck and Uffink [2011] claim that orthodox quantum
mechanics violates the statistical sufficiency conditions (commonly known as
Outcome Independence, following Shimony)
Pra,b(A|B, λ) = Pra,b(A|λ) (5a)
Pra,b(B|A, λ) = Pra,b(B|λ) (5b)
while conforming to the functional sufficiency conditions (commonly known
as Parameter Independence, following Shimony)
Pra,b(A|λ) = Pra(A|λ) (6a)
Pra,b(B|λ) = Prb(B|λ) (6b)
Statistical sufficiency is a condition employed by statisticians in situations
where considerations of locality and causality simply don’t arise. But in this
application the failure of quantum theory to provide a specification of beables
in region 3 such that the outcome B is always redundant for determining the
probability of outcome A (and similarly with ‘A’, ‘B’ interchanged) has clear
connections to local causality, as Seevinck and Uffink’s [2011] analysis has shown.
In the light of Seevinck and Uffink’s [2011] analysis, perhaps Bell’s local
causality condition (LC) should be reformulated as follows:
(LCSU ) A theory is said to be locally causalSU if it acknowledges
a class Rλ of beables λ in space-time region 3 whose values may be
attached independently of the choice of a,b and are then sufficient
to render b functionally redundant and B statistically redundant for
the task of specifying the probability of A in region 1.
The notions of statistical and functional redundancy appealed to here are as
follows:
For λεRλ, λ renders B statistically redundant for the task of
specifying the probability of A iff Pra,b(A|B, λ) = Pra,b(A|λ).
For λεRλ, λ renders b functionally redundant for the task of
specifying the probability of A iff Pra,b(A|λ) = Pra(A|λ).
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Though admittedly less general than (LC), (LC)SU seems less problematic
but just as well motivated by (IP), as applied to the scenario depicted in Figure
1. If correlations in violation of the CHSH inequality are locally inexplicable
in so far as no theory of local beables can explain them consistent with (LC),
then they surely also count as locally inexplicable in so far as no theory of local
beables can explain them consistent with (LC)SU . But Bell himself said we
should regard his step from (IP) to (LC) with the utmost suspicion, and that is
what I shall do. My grounds for suspicion are my belief that quantum mechanics
itself helps us to explain the particular correlations violating CHSH inequalities
that Bell [2004, pp. 151-2] claimed to be locally inexplicable without action at
a distance. Moreover, that explanation involves no superluminal action, and
there is even a sense in which it is local.
To assess the status of (LC) (or (LC)SU ) in quantum mechanics one needs to
say first how it is applied to yield probabilities attached to values of local beables
in a space-time region 1 and then what it would be for these to be altered by
specification of values of local beables in a space-like separated region 2. This
is not a straightforward matter. The Born rule may be correctly applied to
yield more than one chance for the same event in region 1, and there is more
than one way to understand the requirement that these chances be unaltered
by what happens in region 2. As we’ll see, the upshot is that while Born
rule probabilities do violate (Factorizability) (or (FactorizabilitySU)) here, this
counts as a violation of (LC) (or (LC)SU ) only if that condition is applied in a
way that is not motivated by (IP)’s prohibition of space-like causal influences.
3 Probability and chance
Bell credited his formulation of local causality (LC) with avoiding the ”rather
vague notions” of cause and effect by replacing them with a condition of prob-
abilistic independence. The connection to (IP)’s motivating talk of ‘cause’ and
‘effect’ is provided by the thought that a cause alters (and typically raises) the
chance of its effect. But this connection can be made only by using the general
probabilities supplied by a theory to supply chances of particular events.
By chance I mean the definite, single-case probability of an individual event
such as rain tomorrow in Tucson. As in this example, its chance depends on
when the event occurs—afterwards, it is always 0 or 1: and it may vary up until
that time as history unfolds. Chance is important because of its conceptual
connections to belief and action. The chance of e provides an agent’s best guide
to how strongly to believe that e occurs, when not in a position to be certain
that it does.4 And the comparison between e’s chances according as (s)he does
or does not do D are critical in the agent’s decision about whether to do D.
These connections explain why the chance of an event defaults to 0 or 1 when the
agent is in a position to be certain about it—typically, after it does or doesn’t
occur.
4I use the “tenseless present” rather than the more idiomatic future tense here for reasons
that will soon become clear.
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Probabilistic theories may be useful guides to the chances of events, but what
they directly yield are not chances but general probabilities of the form PrC(E)
for an event of type E relative to reference class C. To apply such a general
probability to yield the chance of e, you need to specify the type E of e and also
the reference class C. A probabilistic theory may offer alternative specifications
when applied to determine the chance of e, in which case it becomes necessary
to choose the appropriate specifications. Actuarial tables may be helpful when
estimating the chance that you will live to be 100, but you differ in all kinds of
ways from every individual whose death figures in those tables. What you want
is the most complete available specification of your situation: this may include
much irrelevant information, but it’s not necessary to exclude this since it won’t
affect the chance anyway. In Minkowski space-time, the conceptual connection
between chance (Ch) and the degree of belief (Cr) it prescribes is captured in
this version of David Lewis’s Principal Principle that implicitly defines chance:5
The chance of e at p, conditional on any information Ip about the
contents of p’s past light cone satisfies: Crp(e/Ip) =df Chp(e).
Now consider an agent who accepts quantum theory and wishes to de-
termine the chance of the event eA that the next photon detected by Al-
ice registers as vertically polarized (VA). Assuming that the state |Φ+〉 =
1√
2
(|H〉 |H〉+ |V 〉 |V 〉) was prepared and the settings a, b chosen long before,
the agent is also in a position to be certain what these were. The agent is
then in a position to use the Born rule to determine the chance of eA. But
that chance must be relativized not just to a time, but (relativistically) to a
space-time point. So consider the following diagram:
As this shows, if the outcome in region 2 is of type VB then Chp(eA) =
Chp′(eA) = Chr(eA) =
1
2 , but Chq(eA) = cos
2 6 ab. These are the chances that
follow from application of the Born rule to state |Φ+〉, given settings a, b. In
each case the event eA of the next photon detected in 1’s registering as vertically
polarized has been specified as of type VA, and the specification of the reference
class at least includes the state and settings. Specifically,
Chp(eA) = Pr
Φ+
a,b (VA) = ||PˆA(V )Φ+||2 =
1
2
.
Chq(eA) = Pr
Φ+
a,b (VA|VB) ≡
PrΦ
+
a,b (VA, VB)
PrΦ
+
b (VB)
=
1
2 cos
2 6 ab
1
2
= cos2 6 ab
Note that the reference class used in calculating Chq(eA) is narrower: it is
further restricted by specification of the outcome as of type VB in region 2.
Any agent who accepts quantum theory and is (momentarily) located at
space-time point x should match credence in eA to Chx(eA) because it is pre-
cisely the role of chance to reflect the epistemic bearing of all information ac-
cessible at x on facts not so accessible, and to accept quantum theory is to treat
5See Ismael [2008]. I have slightly altered her notation to avoid conflict with my own.
Here ‘e’ ambiguously denotes both an event and the proposition that it occurs. Cr stands for
credence: an agent’s degree of belief in a proposition, represented on a scale from 0 to 1 and
required to conform to the standard axioms of probability.
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Figure 2:
it as an expert when assessing the chances. This is so whether or not an agent
is actually located at x—fortunately, since it is obviously a gross idealization to
locate the epistemic deliberations of a physically situated agent at a space-time
point! A hypothetical agent located at q in the forward light cone of region 2
(but not 1) has access to the additional information that the outcome in 2 is
of type VB : so the reference class used to infer the chance of eA at q from the
Born rule should include that information. That is why Chq(eA) is determined
by the conditional Born probability PrΦ
+
a,b (VA|VB) but Chp(eA) is determined
by the unconditional Born probability PrΦ
+
a,b (VA).
In the special case that the settings a, b coincide (the polarizers are perfectly
aligned) application of the Born rule yields the chances depicted in Figure 3.
Bell ([2004, pp. 240-41]) took this example as a simple demonstration that
ordinary quantum mechanics is not locally causal, crediting the argument of
EPR [1935]. He begins
Each of the counters considered separately has on each repetition of
the experiment a 50% chance of saying ‘yes’.
Each of the chances Chp(eA), Chp′(eB) is
1
2 , as Bell says: but Chq(eA) = 1.
After noting that quantum theory here requires a perfect correlation between
the outcomes in 1,2, he continues
”So specification of the result on one side permits a 100% confident
prediction of the previously totally uncertain result on the other side.
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Figure 3:
Now in ordinary quantum mechanics there just is nothing but the
wavefunction for calculating probabilities. There is then no question
of making the result on one side redundant on the other by more fully
specifying events in some space-time region 3. We have a violation
of local causality.”
It is true that (Factorizability) and (FactorizabilitySU) fail here, since
PrΦ
+
a,a(VA|VB) = 1, PrΦ
+
a,a(HA|VB) = 0, while PrΦ
+
a,a(A) = Pr
Φ+
a,a(B) =
1
2 . But
does that constitute a violation of local causality? (LC) and (LCSU ) are both
conditions straightforwardly applicable to a theory whose general probabilities
yield a unique chance for each possible outcome in 1 prior to its occurrence. In
the case of quantum theory, however, the general Born rule probabilities yield
multiple chances for each possible outcome in 1, each at the same time (in the
laboratory frame): Chp(eA) =
1
2 , but Chq(eA) = 1 (assuming the outcome in
2 is of type VB). When (LC) speaks of “the probabilities attached to [eA, e¯A]
in a space-time region 1 being unaltered by specification of [VB ] in a space-like
separated region 2” (my italics), which probabilities are these?
Since the connection to (IP)’s motivating talk of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’
is provided by the thought that a cause alters the chance of its effect, (LC) is
motivated only if applied to the chances of eA, e¯A in region 1. But Chp(eA) is not
altered by specification of VB in space-like separated region 2: its value depends
only on what happens in the backward light cone of 1, in conformity to its role
in prescribing Crp(eA). Of course Chq(eA) does depend on the outcome in 2. If
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it did not, it could not fulfill its constitutive role of prescribing Crq(eA/Iq) no
matter what information Iq provides about the contents of q’s past light cone.
It follows that Chq(eA) is not altered but specified by specification of the result
in 2.
Only for a hypothetical agent whose world-line has entered the future
light cone of 2 at q is it true that specification of the result in 2 permits a
100% confident prediction of the previously totally uncertain result on the other
side. A hypothetical agent at p is not in a position to make a 100% confident
prediction: for such an agent the result in 1 remains totally uncertain: what
happens in 2 makes no difference to what (s)he should believe, since region 2 is
outside the backward light cone of p. That is why it is Chp(eA), not Chq(eA),
that says what is certain at p. Newtonian absolute time fostered the illusion of
the occurrence of future events becoming certain for everyone at the same time—
when they occur if not sooner. Relativity requires certainty, like chance, to be
relativized to space-time points—idealized locations of hypothetical knowers.
So does ordinary quantum mechanics violate local causality? If “the
probabilities” (LC) speaks of are PrΦ
+
a,b (VA), P r
Φ+
a,b (HA), and the condition
that these be unaltered is understood to be that PrΦ
+
a,b (VA) = Pr
Φ+
a,a(VA|B),
P rΦ
+
a,b (HA) = Pr
Φ+
a,a(HA|B), then ordinary quantum mechanics violates (LC).
But if this is all (LC) means, then it is not motivated by (IP) and its violation
does not imply that the quantum world is non-local in that there are super-
luminal causal relations between distant events. For (LC) to be motivated by
causal considerations such as (IP), “the probabilities” (LC) speaks of must be
understood to be chances, including Chp(eA) and Chq(eA). But neither of these
would be altered by the specification of the outcome [VB ] in a space-like sepa-
rated region, so local causality would then not be violated. Although it remains
unclear exactly how (LC) (or (LCSU )) is supposed to be applied to quantum
mechanics, one way of applying it is unmotivated by (IP), while if it is applied in
another way quantum mechanics does not violate this local causality condition.
4 Chance and Causation
Suppose in the EPR-Bohm scenario that the outcome in region 2 had been of
type HB instead of VB : then Chq(eA) would have been 0 instead of 1. Suppose
that the polarization axis for the measurement in region 2 had been rotated
through 60◦: then Chq(eA) would have been 14 or
3
4 , depending on the outcome
in region 2. Or suppose that no polarization measurement had been performed
in region 2: then Chq(eA) would have been
1
2 . This shows that Chq(eA) depends
counterfactually on the polarization measurement in 2 and also on its outcome.
Another way to understand talk of “alteration” of “the” probability of an event
of type VA is as the difference between the actual value of Chq(eA) and what its
value would have been had the polarization measurement in 2 or its outcome
been different. Don’t such counterfactual “alterations” in Chq(eA) amount to
causal dependence between space-like separated events, in violation of (IP)?
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There are several reasons why they do not.
The first reason is that while Chq(eA) would be different in each of these
counterfactual scenarios, in none of them would Chp(eA) differ from
1
2 , so the
”local” chance of eA is insensitive to all such counterfactual variations in what
happens in 2. If one wishes to infer causal from counterfactual dependence of
“the” chance of a result in 1 on what happens in 2, then only one of two relevant
candidates for “the” chance displays such counterfactual dependence. For those
who think of chance as itself a kind of indeterministic cause—a localized physical
propensity whose actualization may produce an effect—Chp(eA) seems better
qualified for the title of “the” chance of eA than Chq(eA).
The role of chance in decision provides the second reason. Just as the chance
of e tells you everything you need to know to figure out how strongly to believe
e, the causal dependence of e on d tells you everything you need to know about
e and d when deciding whether to do d (assuming you are not indifferent about
e). As Huw Price [2012] put it, “causal dependence should be regarded as
an analyst-expert about the conditional credences required by an evidential
decision maker”.
Consider the situation of a hypothetical agent Bob at p′ deciding whether to
act by affecting what happens in 2 to try to get outcome eA in 1. Bob can choose
not to measure anything, or he can choose to measure polarization with respect
to any axis b. If he were to measure nothing, Chq(eA) would be
1
2 . If he were
to measure polarization with respect to the same axis as Alice, then Chq(eA)
would be either 0 or 1, with an equal chance (at his momentary location p′) of
either outcome. Since he can neither know nor affect which of these chances it
will be, he must base his decision on his best estimate of Chq(eA) in accordance
with Ismael’s [2008] Ignorance Principle:
“Where you’re not sure about the chances, form a mixture of the
chances assigned by different theories of chance with weights deter-
mined by your relative confidence in those theories.”
Following this principle, Bob should assign Chq(eA) the estimated value
1
2 .0 +
1
2 .1 =
1
2 , and base his decision on that. Since measuring polarization
with respect to the same axis as Alice would not raise his estimated chance of
securing outcome eA in 1, he should eliminate this option whether or not he could
execute it. His estimated value of Chq(eA) were he to measure polarization with
respect to an axis rotated 60◦ from Alice’s is also 12 (
1
2 .
1
4 +
1
2 .
3
4 =
1
2 ). Similarly
for any other angle. This essentially recapitulates part of the content of the
no-signalling theorems, going back to Eberhard [1978]. Bell [2004, pp. 237-8]
shows why manipulation of external fields at p′ or in 2 would also fail to alter
Bob’s estimated value of Chq(eA).
But what if Bob had simply arranged for the measurement in 2 to have had
the different outcome e¯B? Then Chq(eA) would have been 0 instead of 1. No-one
who accepts quantum mechanics can countenance this counterfactual scenario.
The Born rule implies that PrΦ
+
b (HB) =
1
2 , and anyone who accepts quantum
mechanics accepts the implication that Chp′(e¯B) =
1
2 . So anyone who accepts
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quantum mechanics will have credence Crp′ (e¯B/Ip′) =
1
2 no matter what he
takes to happen in the backward light cone of p′ (as specified by Ip′ ).6 If he
accepts quantum mechanics, Bob will conclude that there is nothing it makes
sense to contemplate doing to alter his estimate of Chp′(e¯B), and so there is no
conceivable counterfactual scenario in which one in Bob’s position arranges for
the measurement in 2 to have had the different outcome e¯B. In general, there is
causal dependence between events in 1 and 2 only if it makes sense to speak of
an intervention in one of these regions that would affect a hypothetical agent’s
estimated chance of what happens in the other. Anyone who accepts quantum
mechanics should deny that makes sense.
Perhaps the most basic reason why counterfactual dependencies between
happenings in region 2 and the chance(s) of eA are no sign of causal depen-
dence is that chances are not beables, and are incapable of entering into causal
relations. That Bell thought they behaved like beables is suggested by the [1975]
paper in which he introduced local causality as a natural generalization of local
determinism:
“In Maxwell’s theory, the fields in any space-time region 1 are de-
termined by those in any space region V , at some time t, which
fully closes the backward light cone of 1. Because the region V is
limited, localized, we will say the theory exhibits local determinism.
We would like to form some no[ta]tion of local causality in theories
which are not deterministic, in which the correlations prescribed by
the theory, for the beables, are weaker.” [2004, p. 53]
It seems Bell thought the chances prescribed by a theory that is not deter-
ministic were analogous to the beables of Maxwell’s electromagnetism, so that
while local determinism (locally) specified the local[ized] beables (e.g. fields),
local causality should (locally) specify the local[ized] chances of beables, where
those chances (like local beables) are themselves localized physical magnitudes.
Others have joined Bell in this view of chances as localized physical mag-
nitudes. But quantum mechanics teaches us that chances are not localized
physical propensities whose actualization may produce an effect. Maudlin says
what he means by calling probabilities objective:
“...there could be probabilities that arise from fundamental physics,
probabilities that attach to actual or possible events in virtue solely
of their physical description and independent of the existence of cog-
nizers. These are what I mean by objective probabilities.” (Beisbart
and Hartmann eds., [2011, p. 294])
Although quantum chances do attach to actual or possible events, they are
not objective in this sense. As we saw, the chance of outcome eA does not attach
to it in virtue solely of its physical description: the chances of eA attach also
6A unitary evolution Φ+ ⇒ Ξ+ corresponding to a local interaction there would still yield
PrΞ
+
b
(HB) =
1
2
.
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in virtue of its space-time relations to different space-time locations. Each such
location offers the epistemic perspective of a situated agent, even in a world with
no such agents. The existence of these chances is independent of the existence
of cognizers. But it is only because we are not merely cognizers but physically
situated agents that we have needed to develop a concept of chance tailored to
our needs as informationally deprived agents. Quantum chance admirably meets
those needs: an omniscient God could describe and understand the physical
world without it.
While they are neither physical entities nor physical magnitudes, quantum
chances are objective in a different sense. They supply an objective prescription
for the credences of an agent in any physical situation. Anyone who accepts
quantum mechanics is committed to following that prescription.
5 A view of quantum mechanics
As I see it [2012], it is not the function of quantum states, observables, prob-
abilities or the Schro¨dinger equation to represent or describe the condition or
behavior of a physical system to which they are associated. These elements
function in other ways when a quantum model is applied in predicting or ex-
plaining physical phenomena such as non-localized correlations. Assignment of
a quantum state may be viewed as merely the first step in a procedure that li-
censes a user of quantum mechanics to express claims about physical systems in
descriptive language and then warrants that user in adopting appropriate epis-
temic attitudes toward some of these claims. The language in which such claims
are expressed is not the language of quantum states or operators, and the claims
are not about probabilities or measurement results: they are about the values
of physical magnitudes, and I’ll refer to them as magnitude claims. Magnitude
claims were made by physicists and others before the development of quantum
mechanics and continue to be made, some in the same terms, others in terms
newly introduced as part of some scientific advance. But even though quantum
mechanics represents an enormous scientific advance, claims about quantum
states, operators and probability distributions are not magnitude claims.
The quantum state has two roles. One is in the algorithm provided
by the Born Rule for assigning probabilities to significant claims of the form
M∆(s) : The value of M on s lies in ∆, where M is a physical magnitude, s is
a physical system and ∆ is a Borel set of real numbers. In what follows, I will
call a descriptive claim of the form M∆(s) a canonical magnitude claim. For
two such claims the formal algorithm may be stated as follows:
Pr(M∆(s), NΓ(s)) = Tr(ρPˆ
M [∆].PˆN [Γ]) (Born Rule)
Here ρ represents a quantum state as a density operator on a Hilbert space
Hs and PˆM [∆] is the value for ∆ of the projection-valued measure defined by
the unique self-adjoint operator on Hs corresponding to M .
But the significance of a claim likeM∆(s) varies with the circumstances
to which it relates. Accordingly, a quantum state plays a second role by mod-
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ulating the content of M∆(s) or any other magnitude claim by modifying its
inferential relations to other claims. Because I believe the nature of this modula-
tion of content renders inappropriate the metaphor of magnitudes corresponding
to elements of reality, I recommend against thinking of magnitudes that figure
in canonical or other magnitude claims as beables, even though many such
magnitude claims are true. But if one insists on calling magnitudes that figure
in magnitude claims beables, these magnitudes are not beables introduced by
quantum mechanics—they are at most beables recognized in its applications.7
The quantum state is not a beable in this view. Indeed, since none of
the distinctively quantum elements of a quantum model qualifies as a beable in-
troduced by the theory, quantum mechanics has no beables of its own. Viewed
this way, a quantum state does not describe or represent some new element of
physical reality.8 But nor is it the quantum state’s role to describe or represent
the epistemic state of any actual agent. A quantum state assignment is objec-
tively true (or false): in that deflationary sense a quantum state is objectively
real. But its function is not to say what the world is like but to help an agent
applying quantum mechanics to predict and explain what happens in it. It is
physical conditions in the world that make a quantum state assignment true (or
false). True quantum state assignments are backed by true magnitude claims,
though some of these are typically about physical systems other than that to
which the state is assigned.
Any application of quantum mechanics involves claims describing a
physical situation. While it is considered appropriate to make claims about
where individual particles are detected contributing to the interference pattern
in a contemporary interference experiment, claims about through which slit each
particle went are frequently alleged to be “meaningless”. In its second role the
quantum state offers guidance on the inferential powers, and hence the content,
of canonical magnitude claims.
The key idea here is that even assuming unitary evolution of a joint
quantum state of system and environment, delocalization of system state coher-
ence into the environment will typically render descriptive claims about experi-
mental outcomes and the condition of apparatus and other macroscopic objects
appropriate by endowing these claims with enough content to license an agent
to adopt epistemic attitudes toward them, and in particular to apply the Born
Rule. But an application of quantum mechanics to determine whether this is so
will not require referring to any system as “macroscopic”, as an “apparatus” or
as an “environment”. All that counts is how a quantum state of a super-system
evolves in a model, given a Hamiltonian associated with an interaction between
the system of interest and the rest of that super-system.
It is important to note that since the formulation of the Born Rule now
involves no explicit or implicit reference to “measurement”, Bell’s ([2004, pp.
213-31]) strictures against the presence of the term ‘measurement’ in a precise
formulation of quantum mechanics are met. None of the other proscribed terms
7Compare Bell [2004, p. 55].
8Compare Bell [2004, p. 53]: ”...this does not bother us if we do not grant beable status
to the wave-function.”
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‘classical’, ‘macroscopic’, ‘irreversible’, or ‘information’ appears in its stead.
Since an agent’s assignment of a quantum state does not serve to rep-
resent a system’s properties, her reassignment of a “collapsed” state on gaining
new information represents no change in that system’s properties. That is why
collapse is not a physical process, in this view of quantum mechanics. Nor
does the Schro¨dinger equation express a fundamental physical law: to assign
a quantum state to a system is not to represent its dynamical properties. A
formulation of quantum mechanics has no need to include a statement distin-
guishing the circumstances in which physical processes of Schro¨dinger evolution
and “collapse” occur. An agent can use quantum mechanics to track changes
of the dynamical properties of a system by noting what magnitude claims are
significant and true of it at various times. But quantum mechanics itself does
not imply any such claim, even when an agent would be correct to assign a
system a quantum state, appropriately apply the Born Rule, and conclude that
the claim has probability 1.
Quantum states are relational on this interpretation. When agents (ac-
tually or merely hypothetically) occupy relevantly different physical situations
they should assign different quantum states to one and the same system, even
though these different quantum state assignments are equally correct. The
primary function of Born probabilities is to offer a physically situated agent
authoritative advice on how to apportion degrees of belief concerning content-
ful canonical magnitude claims that the agent is not currently in a position
to check. That is why the Born rule should be applied by differently situated
agents to assign different chances to a single canonical magnitude claim M∆(s)
about a system s in a given situation. These different chance assignments will
then be equally objective and equally correct.
The physical situation of a (hypothetical or actual) agent will change
with (local) time. The agent may come to be in a position to check the truth-
values of previously inaccessible magnitude claims, some of which may be taken
truly to describe outcomes of measurements. If a quantum state is to continue
to provide the agent with good guidance concerning still inaccessible magnitude
claims, it must be updated to reflect these newly accessible truths. The required
alteration in the quantum state is not a physical process involving the system,
in conflict with Schro¨dinger evolution. What has changed is just the physical
relation of the agent to events whose occurrence is described by true magnitude
claims. This is not represented by a discontinuous change in the quantum
state of some model: it corresponds to adoption of a new quantum model that
incorporates additional information, newly accessible to the user of quantum
mechanics.
The preceding paragraphs contained a lot of talk of agents. To forestall
misunderstandings, I emphasize that quantum mechanics is not about agents or
their states of knowledge or belief: A precise formulation of quantum mechanics
will not speak of such things in its models any more than it will speak of agents’
measuring, observing or preparing activities. If quantum mechanics is about
anything it is about the quantum systems, states, observables and probability
measures that figure in its models. Quantum mechanics, like all scientific the-
16
ories, was developed by (human) agents for the use of agents (not necessarily
human: while insisting that any agent be physically situated, I direct further
inquiry on the constitution of agents to cognitive scientists). Trivially, only an
agent can apply a theory for whatever purpose. So any account of a predictive,
explanatory or other application of quantum mechanics naturally involves talk
of agents.
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6 How to use quantum mechanics to explain
non-localized correlations
In his [1981] Bell argued that
certain particular correlations, realizable according to quantum me-
chanics, are locally inexplicable. They cannot be explained, that is
to say, without action at a distance. [2004, pp. 151-2]
The particular correlations to which Bell refers arise, for example, in the
EPR-Bohm scenario in which pairs of spin 12 ”particles” are prepared in a sin-
glet spin state, then at widely separated locations each element of a pair is
passed through a Stern-Gerlach magnet and detected either in the upper or
in the lower part of a screen. By calling them realizable rather than realized
he acknowledged the experimental difficulties associated with actually produc-
ing statistics supporting them in the laboratory (or elsewhere). Enormous im-
provements in experimental technique since 1981 have overcome most of the
difficulties associated with performing a “loophole-free” test of CHSH or other
so-called Bell inequalities and at the same time provided very strong statistical
evidence for quantum mechanical predictions in analogous experiments. Since
the improvements have been most dramatic for experiments involving polariza-
tion measurements on entangled photons, it is appropriate to refer back to the
experimental scenario discussed by Bell in 1990 ([2004, pp. 232-248]).
Suppose photon pairs are prepared at a central source in the entangled
polarization state Φ+ = 1/
√
2(|HH〉 + |V V 〉), and the photons in a pair are
both subsequently detected in coincidence at two widely separated locations
after each has passed through a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) with axis set
at a, b respectively. If a photon is detected with polarization parallel to this
axis, a macroscopic record signifies “yes”: if it is detected with polarization
perpendicular to this axis, the record signifies “no”. Let the record “yes” at
one location be the event of a magnitude A taking on value +1, “no” the event
of A taking on value −1, and similarly for B at the other location. Let a be
a locally generated signal that quickly sets the axis of the PBS on the A side
to an angle a◦ from some standard direction, and similarly for b on the B side.
Assume this is done so that each of a and A’s taking on a value is space-like
separated from each of b and B’s taking on a value. In this scenario quantum
mechanics predicts that, for a◦ = 0◦, a′◦ = 45◦, b◦ = 22 12
◦, b′◦ = −22 12◦
E(a, b) + E(a, b′) + E(a′, b)− E(a′, b′) = 2
√
2 (7)
where, for example, E(a, b) ≡ Pra,b(+1,+1) + Pra,b(−1,−1)− Pra,b(+1,−1)−
Pra,b(−1,+1). This is in violation of the CHSH inequality
|E(a, b) + E(a, b′) + E(a′, b)− E(a′, b′)| ≤ 2 (CHSH)
that follows from (FactorizabilitySU). Bell claims these correlations are realiz-
able according to quantum mechanics but that they cannot be explained without
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action at a distance. While it is generally acknowledged that quantum mechan-
ics successfully predicts Bell’s particular correlations, demonstrating this will
illustrate the present view of quantum mechanics. To decide whether it also
explains them we need to ask what more is required of an explanation.
What we take to be a satisfactory explanation has changed during the
development of physics, and we may confidently expect such change to continue.
One who accepts quantum mechanics is able to offer a novel kind of explanation.
Nevertheless, explanations of phenomena using quantum mechanics may be seen
to meet two very general conditions met by many, if not all, good explanations
in physics.
(i) They show that the phenomenon to be explained was to be expected, and
(ii) they say what it depends on.
Quantum mechanics enables us to give explanations meeting both conditions.
Meeting the first condition is straightforward. Anyone accepting quan-
tum mechanics can use the Born Rule applied to state Φ+ to calculate joint
probabilities such as Pra,b(A,B) and go on to derive (7). So for anyone who ac-
cepts quantum mechanics, violation of the CHSH inequalities is to be expected.
But it is worth showing in more detail how quantum mechanics can be applied
to derive (7) because this will help to exhibit the relational nature of quan-
tum states and probabilities while making it clear that a precise formulation of
quantum mechanics need not use the word ‘measurement’ or any other term on
Bell’s list of proscribed words [2004, p. 215].
Figure 4:
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Figure 4 is a space-time diagram depicting space-like separated polariza-
tion measurements by Alice and Bob in regions 1,2 respectively on a photon pair.
Time is represented in the laboratory frame. At t1 each takes the polarization
state of the L−R photon pair to be Φ+ = 1/√2(|HH〉+ |V V 〉). What justifies
this quantum state assignment is their knowledge of the conditions under which
the photon pair was produced—perhaps by parametric down-conversion of laser
light by passage through a non-linear crystal. Such knowledge depends on in-
formation about the physical systems involved in producing the pair. This state
assignment is backed by significant magnitude claims about such systems—if
anything counts as a claim about beables recognized by quantum mechanics,
these do. Then Alice measures polarization of photon L along axis a◦, Bob
measures polarization of photon R along axis b◦. Decoherence at the photon
detectors licenses both of them to treat the Born rule measure corresponding
to state assignment Φ+ as a probability distribution over significant canonical
magnitude claims about the values of A,B.
At t1 Alice and Bob should both assign state Φ
+ and apply the Born Rule
to calculate the joint probability PrΦ
+
a,b (A,B) assigned to claims about the val-
ues of magnitudes A,B—claims that we may, but need not, choose to describe
as records of polarization measurements along both a◦, b◦ axes—and hence the
(well-defined) conditional probability PrΦ
+
a,b (A,B)/Pr
Φ+
a,b (B) = |〈A|B〉|2. Each
will then expect the observed non-localized correlations between the outcomes
of polarization measurements in regions 1,2 when the detectors are set along the
a◦, b◦ axes. They will expect analogous correlations as these axes are varied,
and so they will expect (7) (violating the CHSH inequality) in such a scenario.
At t2, after recording polarization VB for R, Bob should assign pure
state |VB〉 to L and use the Born Rule to calculate the probabilities Pr|VB>a (A) =
|〈A|VB〉|2 for Alice to record polarization of L with respect to the a◦-axis. At
t2, Alice should assign state ρˆ =
1
2 1ˆ to L, and use the Born Rule to calculate
probability Prρa(A) =
1
2 that she will record either polarization of L with respect
to the a◦-axis. In this way each forms expectations as to the outcome of Alice’s
measurement on the best information available to him or her at t2. Alice’s
statistics of her outcomes in many repetitions of the experiment are just what
her quantum state 12 1ˆ for L led her to expect, thereby helping to explain her
results. Bob’s statistics for Alice’s outcomes (in many repetitions in which his
outcome is VB) are just what his quantum state |VB〉 for L led him to expect,
thereby helping him to explain Alice’s results.
There is no question as to which, if either, of the quantum states |VB〉,
1
2 1ˆ was the real state of Alice’s photon at t2. Neither of the different probabilities
|〈A|VB〉|2 or 12 represents a unique physical propensity at t2 of Alice’s outcome—
even though neither its chance at p nor its chance at q is subjective. This
discussion applies independent of the time-order in Alice’s frame of the regions
1, 2 in Figure 1: had she been moving away from Bob fast enough, she would
have represented 1 as earlier than 2.
It is widely acknowledged that one cannot explain a phenomenon merely
by showing that it was to be expected in the circumstances. To repeat a hack-
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neyed counterexample, the falling barometer does not explain the coming storm
even though it gives one reason to expect a storm in the circumstances. As
a joint effect of a common cause, a symptom does not explain its other inde-
pendent effects. But a system’s being in a quantum state at a time is not a
symptom of causes specified by the true magnitude claims that back it since it
is not an event distinct from the conditions those claims describe. Each event
figuring in Bell’s particular correlations is truly described by a canonical mag-
nitude claim. We may choose to describe some, but not all, such events as an
outcome of a quantum measurement on a system: the probabilities of many of
those events depend counterfactually on the particular entangled state assigned
at t1—if that state had been different, so would these probabilities. But this
dependence is not causal. In quantum mechanics, neither states nor probabili-
ties are the sorts of things that can bear causal relations: in Bell’s terminology,
they are not beables.
When relativized to the physical situation of an actual or hypothetical
agent, a quantum state assignment is objectively true or false—which depends
on the state of the world. More specifically, a quantum state assignment is
made true by the true magnitude claims that back it. One true magnitude
claim backing the assignment of |VB〉 to L at q reports the outcome of Bob’s
polarization measurement in region 2 of Figure 1: but there are others, since this
would not have been the correct assignment had the correct state assignment
at p′ been |HA〉|VB〉. We also need to ask for the backing of the entangled state
Φ+.
There are many ways of preparing state Φ+, and this might also be
the right state to assign to some naturally occurring photon pairs that needed
no preparation. In each case there is a characterization in terms of some set
of true magnitude claims describing the systems and events involved: these
back the state assignment Φ+. It may be difficult or even impossible to give
this characterization in a particular case, but that is just an epistemic problem
which need not be solved even by experimenters skilled in preparing or otherwise
assigning this state. Φ+ will be correctly assigned at p′ only if some set of true
magnitude claims backing that assignment is accessible from p′: events making
them true must lie in the backward light-cone of p′.
A quantum state counterfactually depends on the true magnitude claims
that back it in somewhat the same way that a dispositional property depends
on its categorical basis. The state Φ+ may be backed by alternative sets of
true magnitude claims just as a person may owe his immunity to smallpox to
any of a variety of categorical properties. If Walt owes his smallpox immunity
to antibodies, his possession of antibodies does not cause his immunity: it is
what his immunity consists in. No more is the state Φ+ caused by its backing
magnitude claims: a statement assigning state Φ+ is true only if backed by some
true magnitude claims of the right kind. A quantum state is counterfactually
dependent on whatever magnitude claims back it because backing is a kind of
determination or constitution relation, not because it is a causal relation.
In this view, a quantum state causally depends neither on the physical
situation of the (hypothetical or actual) agent assigning it nor on any of its
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backing magnitude claims. The correct state |VB〉 to be assigned to L at q is
not causally dependent on anything about Bob’s physical situation even if he
happens to be located at q: it is not causally dependent on the outcome of Bob’s
polarization measurement in region 2: and it is not causally dependent on how
Bob sets his polarizer in region 2. But a quantum state assignment is not just
a function of the subjective epistemic state of any agent: If Bob or anyone else
were to assign a state other than |VB〉 to L at q he or she would be making a
mistake.
The quantum derivation of (7) shows not only that Bell’s particular
correlations were to be expected, but also what they depend on. They depend
counterfactually but not causally on the quantum state Φ+, and they also de-
pend counterfactually on that state’s backing conditions, as described by true
magnitude claims. The status of the quantum state disqualifies it from partici-
pation in causal relations, but true magnitude claims may be taken to describe
beables recognized by quantum mechanics. To decide which conditions backing
any of the states involved in their explanation describe causes of Bell’s particu-
lar correlations or the events they correlate we need to return to the connection
between causation and chance.
The intuition that, other things being equal, a cause raises (or at least
alters) the chance of its effect is best cashed out in terms of an interventionist
counterfactual: c is a cause of e just in case c, e are distinct actual events and
there is some conceivable intervention on c whose occurrence would have altered
the chance of e. Such an intervention need not be the act of an agent: it could
involve any modification in c of the right kind. Woodward [2003, p. 98] is one
influential attempt to say what kind of external influence this would involve.
Note that Einstein’s formulation of a principle of local action also appeals to
intervention:
The following idea characterizes the relative independence of objects
far apart in space (A and B): external influence on A has no imme-
diate (”unmittelbar”) influence on B; this is known as the ‘principle
of local action’ (Einstein [1948, pp. 321-2])
I used the idea of intervention to argue against any causal dependence be-
tween events in 1 and 2: anyone who accepts quantum mechanics accepts that
it makes no sense to speak of an intervention in one of these regions that would
affect a hypothetical agent’s estimated chance of what happens in the other.
So even though the outcome eB in 2 backs the assignment |VB〉 to L at q, the
outcome in 1 does not depend causally on eB: for similar reasons, neither does
the outcome in 2 depend on that in 1. The same idea can now be used to show
that both these outcomes do depend causally on whatever event o in the overlap
of the backward light cones of 1 and 2 warranted assignment of state Φ+—an
event truly described by magnitude claims that backed this assignment.
Assume first that the events a, b at which the polarizers are set on a
particular occasion occur in the overlap of the backward light cones of 1 and 2:
this assumption will later be dropped. Let r be a point outside the future light
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cones of eA, eB but within the future light cone of the event o. Let eA ⊎ eB be
the event of the joint occurrence of eA, eB. This is an event of a type to which
the Born rule is applicable: the application yields its chance Chr(eA ⊎ eB) =
PrΦ
+
a,b (VA, VB) =
1
2 cos
2 6 ab. We already saw that Chr(eA) = PrΦ
+
a,b
(VA) =
1
2 =
PrΦ
+
a,b
(VB) = Chr(eB). The event o affects all these chances: had a different
event o′ occurred backing the assignment of a different state (e.g. |HA〉|VB〉),
or no event backing any state assignment, then any or all of these chances could
have been different. Since it makes sense to speak of an agent altering the
chance of event o at s in its past light cone, we have
Chr(eA ⊎ eB|do− o) 6= Chr(eA ⊎ eB)
Chr(eA|do− o) 6= Chr(eA)
Chr(eB|do− o) 6= Chr(eB)
where do − o means o is the result of an intervention without which o would
not have occurred. It follows that eA, eB, eA ⊎ eB are each causally dependent
on o: o is a common cause of eA, eB even though the probabilities of events
of these types do not factorize. The same reasoning applies to each registered
photon pair on any occasion at any settings a, b. So the second requirement on
explanation is met: the separate recording events, as well as the event of their
joint occurrence, depend causally on the event o that serves to back assignment
of state Φ+ to the photon pairs involved in this scenario.
By rejecting any possibility of an intervention expressed by do − eB or
do− e¯B, anyone accepting quantum mechanics should deny that Chp(q)(eA|do−
eB) 6= Chp(q)(eA|do−e¯B) is true or even meaningful. NeverthelessChq(eA|eB) 6=
Chq(eA|e¯B): in this sense eA depends counterfactually but not causally on eB.
Does such counterfactual dependence provide reason enough to conclude that
eA is part of the explanation of eB? An obvious objection is that because of the
symmetry of the situation with 1 and 2 space-like separated there is an equally
strong reason to conclude that eB is part of the explanation of eA, contrary to
the fundamentally asymmetric nature of the explanation relation. But one can
see that this objection is not decisive by paying attention to the contrasting
epistemic perspectives associated with the different physical situations of hy-
pothetical agents Alice* and Bob* with world-lines confined to interiors of the
light cones of 1, 2 respectively.
As his world-line enters the future light cone of 2 Bob* comes into
position to know the outcome at 2 while still physically unable to observe the
outcome at 1. His epistemic situation is then analogous to that of a hypothetical
agent Chris in a world with a Newtonian absolute time, in a position to know the
outcome of past events but physically unable to observe any future event. Many
have been tempted to elevate the epistemic asymmetry of Chris’s situation into
a global metaphysical asymmetry in which the future is open while the past is
fixed and settled. It is then a short step to a metaphysical view of explanation
as a productive relation in which the fixed past gives rise to the (otherwise)
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open future, either deterministically or stochastically.9
Such a move from epistemology to metaphysics should always be treated
with deep suspicion. But in this case it is clearly inappropriate in a relativistic
space-time since the ”open futures” of agents like Alice* and Bob* cannot be
unified into the open future. This prompts a retreat to a metaphysically drained
view of explanation as rooted in cognitive concerns of a physically situated
agent, motivated by the need to unify, extend and efficiently deploy the limited
information to which it has access.
For many purposes it is appropriate to regard the entire scientific com-
munity as a (spatially) distributed agent, and to think of the provision of sci-
entific explanations as aiding our collective epistemic and practical goals. This
is appropriate insofar as localized agents share an epistemic perspective, with
access to the same information about what has happened. But Alice* and Bob*
do not have access to the same information at time t2 or t3 since they are then
space-like separated. So it is entirely appropriate for Bob* to use eB to explain
eA and for Alice* to use eA to explain eB. This does not make explanation
a subjective matter for two reasons. There is an objective physical difference
between the situations of Alice* and Bob* underlying the asymmetry of their
epistemic perspectives: and by adopting either perspective in thought (as I have
encouraged the reader to do) anyone can come to appreciate how each explana-
tion can help make Bell’s correlations seem less puzzling. Admittedly, neither
explanation is very deep, and I will end by noting one puzzle that remains.
By meeting both minimal requirements on explanation, the application
of quantum theory enables us to explain Bell’s correlations. But is this explana-
tion local? Several senses of locality are relevant here. The explanation involves
no superluminal causal dependence. As stated, the condition of Local Causality
is not applicable to the quantum mechanical explanation since it presupposes
the uniqueness of the probability to which it refers. (FactorizabilitySU) (and
presumably also (Factorizability)) are violated, but Bell ([2004, p. 243]) pre-
ferred to see (Factorizability) as not a formulation but a consequence of ‘local
causality’: I have argued that it is not. To retain its connection to (IP), a version
of Local Causality should speak of chances rather than general probabilities.
A version that equates the unconditional chance of eA to its chance conditional
on eB holds, no matter how these chances are relativized to the same space-
time point. But a version that is clearly motivated by the intuitive principle
(IP) would rather equate the unconditional chance of eA to its chance condi-
tional on an intervention that produces eB. However this version is inapplicable
since acceptance of quantum mechanics renders senseless talk of interventions
producing eB.
The explanation one can give by applying quantum mechanics appeals
to chances that are localized, insofar as they are assigned at space-time points
that may be thought to offer the momentary perspective of a hypothetical ideal-
ized agent whose credences they would guide. But these chances are not quan-
tum beables and they are not physical propensities capable of manifestation at
9See, for example, Maudlin [2007, pp. 173-8].
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those locations (or anywhere else). The only causes figuring in the explanation
are localized where the physical systems are whose magnitudes back the assign-
ment of state Φ+. That chances are not propensities becomes clear when one
drops the assumption that a, b occur in the overlap of the backward light cones
of 1 and 2, as depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5:
If a, b are set at the last moment, the chance of eA ⊎ eB that figures in its
explanation may be located later in the laboratory frame than eA, eB. If chance
were a physical propensity it should act before its manifestation. But chances
aren’t propensities—proximate causes of localized events. They are a localized
agent’s objective guide to credence about epistemically inaccessible events.
I will conclude by noting one sense in which the explanation one can
give using quantum mechanics is not local as it stands. Though it is a (non-
factorizable) cause of events of types A,B in regions 1, 2 respectively, the
event o is not connected to its effects by any spatiotemporally continuous causal
process described by quantum mechanics. This puts the explanation in tension
with the first conjunct of Bell’s ([2004, p. 239]) intuitive locality principle (IP):
”The direct causes (and effects) of events are near by, and even the indirect
causes (and effects) are no further away than permitted by the velocity of light.”
o is separated from both recording events in regions 1, 2 in time, and from
at least one in space. If o is not merely a cause but a direct cause of these events
then it violates the first conjunct of (IP) because it is not nearby. But if one
adopts the present view of quantum mechanics, the theory has no resources to
describe any causes mediating between o and these recording events. So while
25
their quantum explanation is not explicitly inconsistent with the first conjunct
of (IP), mediating causes could be found only by constructing a new theory.
Bell’s work has clearly delineated the obstacles that would have to be overcome
on that path.
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